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ABSTRACT:   Applied econometric work takes a  superficial approach to causality. 
Understanding economic affairs, making good policy decisions, and progress in the 
economic discipline depend on our ability to infer causal relations from data. We review 
the dominant approaches to causality in econometrics, and suggest why they fail to give 
good results. We feel the problem cannot be solved by traditional tools, and requires 
some out-of-the-box thinking. Potentially promising approaches to solutions are 
discussed. 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
 The Cowles Commission had a clear approach to causality in econometric 
models. Causal chains were to be specified in advance of modeling, on the basis of 
theoretical considerations. The econometrician specified the exogenous and endogenous 
variables, and put in zero restrictions when theory indicated no role for a particular 
variable in a structural equation. This approach did not succeed for several reasons. 
General equilibrium suggests that everything causes everything else, and so theory does 
not provide an adequate guide to model specification. Thus, zero restrictions and 
exogeneity assumptions were made on pragmatic grounds. However, substantial conflicts 
and differences of opinions arose on these issues, which could not be resolved either 
empirically or theoretically. Large forecast errors in econometric models following the oil 
crisis in the 70’s also cast a cloud of suspicion on these conventional methodologies. 
Keuzenkamp (2000) provides a history, further references, and a critical evaluation of a 
number of new methodologies which have since been developed. Our focus will be on 
the use of regression models to establish causal relationships.  
 
Most current econometric texts either make no mention of causality, or else 
contain a brief and superficial discussion. Establishing causality is often a central concern 
in many papers in applied econometrics. Differentiating between causes and effects of 
growth, poverty reduction, inflation, etc. is of crucial importance to crafting suitable 
policy and developing an understanding of the world we live in. Due to lack of 
appropriate training, many published articles display very poor understanding of the 
evidence required to support causal claims.  Freedman (2005) discusses numerous articles 
which use regression analysis, and shows how causality claims central to these articles 
reduce to claims based on observed correlations in non-experimental data. Even though 
the ideas that ‘correlation does not prove causation’ and that ‘Granger-Causality is not 
equivalent to causality’ are well-known and oft-repeated, authors nonetheless continue to 
rely on these tools to establish and validate causality claims. Freedman (1991) has argued 
                                                 
1 I am deeply indebted to David Freedman for comments on earlier versions, which saved me from many 
errors of commission and omission, as well as for encouragement and pointing me in the right directions. 
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that discovering causal relations requires more hard work than mere statistical analysis. 
We will argue that these problems are compounded in econometric analysis. It is essential 
to learn about causal chains. Economic theory gives us some, imperfect, guidance on this 
matter. Where the causal chains are clear, regressions are useful in assessing the 
quantitative strength of the causal effect. A discovery of surprising or unexpected 
correlations can lead us to interesting hypotheses about causal mechanisms. While 
regressions can be useful tools as part of exploratory causal analysis, they are not 
adequate for confirmation of causal mechanisms, for reasons to be discussed. 
Establishing causality will usually requiring going outside the range of conventional 
econometric techniques. Regression analysis may point the way, and may serve as part of 
the evidence for a causal mechanism, but establishing causality will require more broadly 
based evidence from different types of sources, and more attention to the structure of the 
real world mechanisms which generate the data.  
  
2. Caricature of a Typical Econometric Argument. 
 
The figure below plots the variables for all countries for which World Bank 
provides information on both variables in 1990. The graph shows the strong positive 
relation between Life Expectancy (LE) and Log of number of newspapers published per 
1000 people (LN). The regression of LE on LN has R2 = 0.81: 
LE = 45.0 + 5.48 LN + ε,   
                      (1.2)   (0.3)       (5.2) (Standard Errors are given in parentheses) 
LN is highly significant. The picture itself shows a clear and strong relationship, and the 
formal statistics does not really add much to the information displayed in the plot. The 
issue is: how to interpret this relationship. 
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Suppose someone were to argue that the significant t-statistic on LN proves that 
reading newspapers leads to longer lives, and argues that developing countries should 
focus on publishing more newspapers as a means for improving life expectancies. Surely, 
such an argument would be greeted with laughter. If this argument was published in a 
journal, we would be concerned about the sloppy standards of refereeing and editorship. 
Nonetheless, arguments equivalent in logical structure to this one are routinely published 
in respectable journals. For example, on the basis of essentially equivalent data (actually, 
weaker data) Lynn and VanHanen (2002) argue at book length that IQ causes GNP 
growth. Volken (2003) has written a rebuttal using careful and detailed statistical analysis  
– the seriousness with which such arguments are taken is another indication of 
fundamental problems with our understanding of causation.  In “Why we learn nothing 
from regressing economic growth on government policies,” Rodrik (2005) has pointed 
out why causal claims regarding effects of policy on the basis of cross country 
regressions are not supported by the correlations, and cited several papers making such 
invalid claims. 
 
Some argue that cases like this arise only because LN proxies for other important 
variables. This means that including the relevant variables will eliminate the significance 
of others. We tried this by including all health relevant variables for which data was 
available in sufficient quantities in the World Bank data base. This led to the following 
regression, with R2 = 0.74: 
LE = 57.2 + 6.0 LN – 0.7 LHB + 0.08 ImpSan – 0.04 ImpWat + 4.8 LPhys + ε 
         (8.9)   (2.7)        (2.8)           (0.06)             (0.16)                 (2.6)           (3.8) 
Here, LHB and LPhys are logs of Hospital Beds and Physicians per 1000 population 
respectively, while ImpSan and ImpWat measure improvements in sanitation and water 
supply. LN remains the only variable which is significant at 95% level. Interestingly, its 
coefficient also remains stable despite the addition of several variables. All variables 
other than LN are insignificant. We will later provide additional arguments why this 
strategy of variable addition is likely to fail as a tool for discovering causal relations. 
 
Typical authors and textbooks remain confused about these issues despite the fact 
that several authors have clearly differentiated between correlation and causation. 
Problems arising from confusing the two have been explicated in many papers ranging 
from the deep and sophisticated theoretical exposition of Engle et. al. (1984) to the lucid 
textbook clarity of Freedman et. al. (2007), and the practical and empirical Rodrik 
(2005). Freedman (2005) discusses the very first paper on multiple regression by Yule, 
published in 1899. Yule regressed percent change in Pauperism on Percent change in 
Outrelief ratio (outside vs inside the poorhouse—the policy debate was on the “new poor 
law” which made in-relief mandatory). The unit of analysis was the “union,” a clump of 
about 25 parishes. These were the bodies that administered relief.  Multiple regression 
was used to control for several possible confounders.Yule came to the conclusion that 
increases in in-relief provisions lead to increases in the number who declare themselves 
poor. However, in a footnote, Yule writes that “strictly speaking, for ‘due to’ read 
associated with.”  If this footnote is taken seriously, then the paper says nothing of 
relevance to the real world, and the policy conclusion drawn is meaningless. Countless 
instances of similar strategies can be pointed out in currently published papers. The text 
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of the analysis makes the usual academic disclaimers and points out difficulties with data, 
and non-equivalence of Granger causality and our common understanding of causality. 
All these caveats are forgotten in the conclusions section which makes causal claims on 
the basis of regressions and policy recommendations on the basis of these causality 
claims.    
 
The point of this discussion is that there are certain aspects of observational data 
which simply cannot be assessed or analysed by any econometric technique, whether 
crude or sophisticated. This is even at the simple level of assessing whether a correlation 
is genuine or spurious. Causal mechanisms require an even deeper knowledge of 
structure than simple correlations. Acquiring and analyzing evidence for causality will 
often require more ‘shoe leather,’ as in Freedman (1991). Recently, Banerjee, Duflo and 
others have systematically resorted to large scale randomized experiments for a number 
of microeconomic propositions, with good results. Similarly, behavioral and experimental 
economists have started generating and gathering data on actual behavior in controlled 
situations. These are promising developments since both utilize experimental data, which 
is vastly superior to observational data in helping to reveal causal mechanisms. 
3. Empirical Failure of Regression Models 
 
Starting from the inauspicious beginning by Yule2, more than a hundred years of 
regressions have failed to yield a single demonstrable and solid successful discovery of a 
causal relationship. Magnus (1999) writes about econometric tests of economic theories 
that “we invited readers to name a published paper that … significantly changed the way 
economists think about some economic proposition.” Total lack of response to this 
challenge suggests that it is time to step back and rethink strategy. In a talk on the 100th 
anniversary of the first published regression by Yule, Freedman (1997, p.113) writes: 
“For nearly a century, investigators in the social sciences have used regression models to 
deduce cause-and-effect relationships from patterns of association. … . In my view, this 
enterprise has not been successful.”  For nearly every posited causal mechanism in 
economic theory,  there are econometric papers on both sides of the issue. A widely 
believed causal claim is that growth of the money stock causes inflation. However, in a 
careful study based on the most recent methodological advances, Hendry and Ericsson 
(1991)  dispute this claim of Friedman and argue that the causality runs in the other 
direction. The core of the rejoinder by Friedman is simply that complex econometric 
analyses often fail in the real world; in support of this he cites personal experience rather 
than analytical or theoretical arguments. The consumption function introduced by Keynes 
is at the heart of macroeconomics, and has been intensively studied. Despite its central 
importance and extensive research, there is a bewildering variety of variables with claims 
to be causes of consumption, all supported by econometric analysis. Furthermore, the 
best available models routinely fail; Thomas (1993, p 284) writes that “Perhaps the most 
worrying aspect of empirical work on aggregate consumption is the regularity with which 
                                                 
2 It seems likely that Yule reached the wrong conclusion. Migrations of the poor from nearby parishes to 
those providing better relief would account for the same effect. Given the deliberately harsh and degrading 
conditions of the poorhouses, it seems unlikely that significant numbers chose to declare themselves as 
paupers if they could afford not to do so.  
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apparently established equations break down when faced with new data. This has 
happened repeatedly in the UK since the 1970s. … the reader may be forgiven for 
wondering whether econometricians will ever reach the stage where even in the short run 
their consumption equations survive confrontation with new data.”  
 
Why is there lack of clarity about an issue of such fundamental importance, which 
is central to our tasks as econometricians and economists? Hoover (2006) discusses the 
history of a tension and paradox originating with Hume which continues to this day in 
economic practice. One the one hand, Hume recognizes the central importance of 
causality to the conduct of economic policy. On the other hand, Hume notes that only 
timing and correlations can be observed, and genuine causal relations are unobservable. 
This tension is reflected in econometrics in the frequency with which causation is 
discussed in the policy recommendations and implications section, and correlations and 
timings equated to causality in the econometric analysis.  
 
An additional factor in the cavalier treatment of causality in econometrics is 
identified by  Blaug (1998): “Economics as taught in graduate schools has become 
increasingly preoccupied with formal technique to the exclusion of studying real-world 
problems and issues.” Inertia and momentum of existing methodologies which have 
acquired respectability, and mechanisms in place for promotions and publication are 
certainly to blame. For example, Hey (1997) summed up his experience of ten years of 
editorship of the Economic Journal by noting the overwhelming predominance of formal 
mathematical models of economic problems:  “Many of the submissions do not appear to 
be written in order to further economic knowledge. … few economists ask themselves 
what are the crucial economic problems facing society. If they did so, they might well 
produce more relevant material.” Articles focused on econometric techniques alone, with 
data and real-world applications serving merely as framework and window dressing for 
demonstration of mathematics and/or clever new statistical techniques are easier to write, 
more easily publishable, and more prestigious, then marshalling of evidence from a 
variety of clues pieced together via less formal arguments often required for genuine 
causal analysis. Discussing several cases of successful discovery of causal relations, 
Freedman (2008) has emphasized the role of qualitative and informal insights in the 
process.   
 
  Discovering causal laws is difficult, and involves substantial effort. It is 
nonetheless possible, and numerous successes are documented by Freedman et. al. 
(2007), including the effectiveness of Salk’s polio vaccine. The relation between smoking 
and cancer is famous for having been established purely on a statistical basis. To 
illustrate the subtle and complex issues which must be resolved to distinguish between 
correlation and causation, note that the suggestion that a genetic factor might dispose one 
towards both smoking and cancer was disproven by looking at cancer rates among 
identical twins with discordant smoking habits.  Along with numerous successes, failures 
and errors in discovering causality are also common. Freedman et. al. (2007) discuss 
many cases in which observational studies led to wrong conclusions, sometimes with 
disastrous consequences. In the next section, we argue that while statisticians can 
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sometimes arrive at the truth, special features of econometric methodology make this 
outcome unlikely for econometricians.   
 
4. Strategies of Surrender. 
  
Hume pointed out that only correlations and timing are observable, while 
causality is inherently unobservable. This has led some to argue that we can get by 
without assessing causal relations. We illustrate why this does not seem correct by a 
simple example. Barro (1997) discovered that education affects development with about a 
10 year lag, while other variables he considered were not significant. This implies that the 
single most significant component of a development strategy is investment on education. 
While this position has substantial intuitive appeal, we wish to consider whether the 
statistical evidence supports a causal link between education and development. The 
evidence is logically equivalent to the evidence supporting the link between newspapers 
and longevity. To decide on whether or not we should invest heavily in education as a 
means to promote development, it is crucial to distinguish between correlation and 
causation.   If we consider this to be mere correlation and fail to invest in education, we 
could be guilty of losing a tremendous opportunity for improving lives of large numbers 
of people. Mistaking a correlation for a causal relation would lead to the opposite 
mistake, akin to investing heavily in newspaper production as a means for prolonging 
life. We cannot afford to be agnostic about the difference between correlations and 
causation. 
 
In wake of disenchantment with econometrics following widespread forecast 
failures in the 70’s, schools of thought which place even greater emphasis on theory and 
even less on data have emerged. The real business cycle (RBC) school of thought in 
macroeconomics uses data to “calibrate” theoretical models – that is numerical 
magnitudes not specified in the theory are measured by using elementary descriptive 
statistics of the data; see Faust and Whiteman (1997). The question of using data to assess 
theory and revise postulated causal mechanisms does not arise in this approach.   
 
The Lucas critique suggested that failure of macroeconomic models results from 
insufficient attention to theory. To remedy this, one should use the data to estimate 
unobservables which economic theory posits (termed ‘deep parameters’), instead of 
directly estimating relationships among observables.  Like the Cowles Commission 
approach, all of these strategies give up on the possibility of learning about causal 
mechanisms from the data. To a lesser extent, they also give up on the possibility of 
learning about the structure, functional forms, and nature of stochastic relations among 
the variables from the data. To be fair, gross conflicts between observations and 
theoretical predictions can take place, and have led to revisions of theory, and even of 
causal chains. Similarly, modifications of functional forms and of specifications for 
errors can and do take place routinely in course of estimation of regression models. 
However, all of these activities fall outside the purview of econometric theory (and are 
done in the basement, out of sight of the high priests who condemn such activities, in the 
metaphor of Leamer, 1983).  
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With a few exceptions to be discussed later, econometric theory does not formally 
allow for learning from data about many crucial aspects of the real world. If we had 
excellent economic theory, which provided a reliable guide to causal and structural 
mechanisms, then we could live with this situation. Unfortunately, we have compelling 
reasons to believe otherwise. Current macroeconomic textbooks discuss the diverse 
opinions of numerous schools of thought; see for example Seven Schools of 
Macroeconomic Thought by Phelps (1991). Papers presented at the AEA Session in 1997 
entitled “Is There a Core of Macroeconomics That We Should All Believe?” (see Bolch, 
1998) highlighted the conflicts over nearly all fundamental macroeconomic propositions.  
In face of such severe conflicts among theorists, it is clear that theory does not provide a 
reliable guide. In such a situation, it is necessary to devise some mechanisms to allow us 
to learn about the world from data. 
 
The substantial and persistent conflicts among theorists have led another school of 
thought, headed by Sims (1980), to the opposite extreme. This school recommends fitting 
a general VAR model to time series data, which treats all variables together as nameless 
pieces of data, and gives no role to theory. In my view, differentiating causality from 
correlation requires some knowledge of structure, and hence the real world quantities 
measured by the variables under study. A purely statistical analysis cannot discover 
causal effects and hence amounts to a strategy of surrender. Nonetheless, such analysis 
can discover patterns of correlation among the data as well as timing. By far the currently 
most popular approach to causality in econometrics is Granger Causality, which 
substitutes timing and correlations for causality. Since such an approach has the potential 
for learning about causality from the data, we defer a discussion to the next section. 
 
5. Methods for Discovering Causality. 
 
Theory does not provide adequate guidance, and we cannot afford to be ignorant, 
so we must use observations and data to learn about causal mechanisms. Aldrich (1989) 
has argued that progress of science is directly related to discovery of causal mechanisms.  
Hoover (2006) has reviewed all extant approaches to causality currently in use in 
economics and econometrics, and also provided a useful categorization and classification. 
Below we follow an alternative scheme, and classify approaches according to the 
evidence used to justify causal inference. This leads to four types of approaches, 
discussed separately below. 
 
Conformity to Theoretical Specifications: We have discussed different types of 
approaches based on a priori specifications of causal schemes. Here a model which fits 
the data and conforms to the a priori specification is taken as evidence of support for the 
a priori causal specifications. Because of the diverse and flexible classes of models 
available to the econometrician, it is very easy to produce models which fit the data, even 
for very bad theories. This is discussed in greater detail in the next section. The literature 
is full of conflicting theories all of which are able to provide evidence of conformity. This 
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is why such methods have failed to uncover any causal mechanisms or resolve any 
theoretical controversies.  
 
Stability and Robustness to Specifications: It is sometimes suggested that ‘robustness’ 
is the key to causal relationships (for example Leamer (1983) as well as several other 
authors). If a variable stands out as significant in a lot of different specifications, then this 
signals a causal relationship. In small data sets, robustness may come about purely by 
accident. For example, an economic theory suggests that annual changes in consumption 
are purely random – the consumer plans his lifetime consumption based on his evaluation 
of his lifetime income. Random shocks to his income can cause random changes in his 
plans, but these are not predictable from past data; see Thomas (1991, p.274-278).  
Letting DCHN and DAUS be the annual change in consumption in China and Australia 
respectively, a regression yields the following results: 
 
DCHN = 1.39E+10    + 7.11 DAUS + ε    (R2 = 0.30)  
    (2.65E+10)   (1.97)        (6.5E+10) 
 
This regression uses WDI Online data on Final consumption expenditure (constant LCU) 
for China (CHN) and Australia (AUS) from 1970 to 2003, and suggests that changes in 
Australian consumption significantly affects the Chinese, rejecting the economic theory. 
Remarkably, the coefficient remains numerically stable and statistically significant even 
after we add many additional countries to this same regression. We regress DCHN on the 
consumption of the countries listed below (three letter codes as per WDI tables). The 
estimated coefficients and associated t-Statistics are listed in the table below; only 
Australia (AUS) is significant, and the coefficient is stable (close to what it is in the 
above regession without the other countries). 
 
  Coefficients Standard Error t Stat 
Intercept 5.87E+10 6.60E+10 0.89
DZA -2.90 2.81 -1.03
ARG -0.43 1.61 -0.27
AUS 8.44 3.12 2.71
AUT -0.59 10.13 -0.06
BGD 0.30 0.38 0.79
BEL -7.42 9.96 -0.75
BEN 0.95 0.58 1.65
BOL -21.50 54.31 -0.40
BFA 0.30 0.42 0.72
CMR -0.01 0.06 -0.11
CAN -1.23 2.29 -0.54
TCD -0.46 0.36 -1.27
CHL 0.00 0.01 0.09
COL -0.02 0.02 -1.17
ZAR -1.82 1.34 -1.36
CIV 0.08 0.08 0.97
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Backed by some plausible sounding theory such as imitation of Australian consumer 
behavior by the Chinese, and impressive statistical names like “Extreme Bounds 
Analysis,” we should be able to convince the unsuspecting victim that the robust and 
reliable relationship cannot be due to chance. The ease with which this and similar 
examples can be produced show that we cannot trust purely statistical analyses on 
observational data sets. Hendry (2000) given many other examples based on the idea that 
‘integrated’ series lead to spurious regressions. Our example above uses differenced 
series and shows that spurious regressions are not just confined to integrated series. 
 
Timing of Correlations: Granger causality is the most popular explicit approach to 
eliciting causal mechanisms from the data. This relies on evidence about timing of 
correlations. Asghar (2007) has shown that Granger causality is very sensitive to minor 
and apparently insignificant details of the testing procedure. Causal chains can reverse 
directions for small changes in specifications, time period of data, variable transforms, 
tests used for model selection and lag length selection, etc. Since econometricians 
routinely experiment with such changes, this accounts for the large numbers of 
conflicting claims about Granger causality which can be found in the literature. A simple 
reason why timing evidence cannot be trusted can be given as follows. Suppose that there 
is an underlying variable M which measures structural changes associated with 
modernization, which reflect in several dimensions in the economy. This variable is not 
directly observed nor easily measurable. Suppose that M leads to increases in LN 
(Newspapers per 1000) in the short run and increases in LE (life expectancy) in the long 
run. Then the data will show a correlation between LN and LE at a later date. This 
correlation will also be robust to addition of other variables, because it is based on real 
structure. Nonetheless, it cannot be relied upon to reveal causation. Nor can we expect 
that multiple regression techniques, or sophisticated treatments via instrumental 
variables, will reveal the problem. Deeper and more sophisticated arguments by Hoover 
(2001) show why we cannot rely on Granger causality to learn about causal mechanisms 
in the context of macroeconomic models. 
 
Patterns of Correlations: No causal relation between X and Y implies stochastic 
independence and zero correlation. Similarly, all causal patterns between a collection of 
variables have implications for patterns of correlations which can exist between these 
variables. Pearl and associates have worked out methods to infer causal chains from the 
observed patterns of correlation in the data. A handful of papers have applied such 
methods in econometrics. See Hoover (2006) for further details and references. There are 
no recorded successes in econometrics for these methods. Some reasons for pessimism 
are given in Freedman (2004). 
 
Natural Experiments: Using knowledge of history outside the purely statistical, one can 
isolate episodes and events where changes are clearly not caused by variables under 
study. This ability to isolate an uncaused event leads to the possibility of studying causes 
by examining relations which remain stable through periods of change. This possibility 
has been exploited by a few researchers ( for example, Angrist and Krueger (2001), 
Hoover (2001), and Asghar (2007) ) to asses causality in various econometric models. 
Hendry’s methodology employs a variant of this technique, and is discussed in section 7 
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below. This approach appears promising as it inputs additional genuine causal 
information outside the purely statistical ones into the procedure of econometric 
inference. Statisticians have been successful in using natural experiments to isolate cause 
and effect from observational data.  The temptation to overfit, using complex models and 
equally complex error processes, tends to make it difficult for econometricians to learn 
from the data. If this tendency could be regulated, this approach should prove fruitful. 
6. The Understudied Problem of Overfitting. 
 
 The extensive variety of models available to the econometrician as vehicles to 
expressing a theory in concrete forms leads to overfitting data in many ways, and 
overfitting leads to lack of validity for regression models. It is well known that changing 
the initial regression model in response to any aspect of the fit leads to lack of validity of 
the diagnostic statistics for the second model fitted. For example, if we select the best 
among 20 regressions, one of these will be significant at 95% level when all of the 
regression are invalid. Jensen (2000) writes that 
“However, this "dark side" of data mining is still largely unknown to some 
practitioners, and problems such as overfitting and overestimation of 
accuracy still arise in knowledge discoveryapplications with surprising 
regularity. In addition, the statistical effects of search can be quite subtle, 
and they can trip up even experienced researchers and practitioners.”  
Despite the fact that model selection almost always takes place in practice and is known 
to affect the validity of regression statistics of the final model presented, it is nearly 
universally ignored in applications. Contributions of a few authors (e.g. Ashley, 1999) 
who have attempted to provide methods for adjusting statistics to account for the search 
process, following the seminal work of Leamer (1983), have been ignored in the 
literature. 
 
If one has a sufficiently rich class of models to provide a perfect fit to any data set, then 
this class will almost certainly overfit the data, and therefore be almost useless for 
discovery of real world structures. Our contention is that the toolbox of the conometrician 
is too rich for comfort.  The full data set for Final Consumption in constant LCU (local 
currency units) for Argentina, taken from WDI online,  is pictured in the graph below. 
 
Suppose we wish to forecast the value of consumption for 2008. We could just 
use the last 5 years of data, which would give almost a perfect fit to a linear model. If we 
want an even more optimistic forecast, a quadratic function could be fitted to the last 10 
points of data. If the quadratic appears strained, a second order ARMA model will 
provide similar results while hiding the ‘cooking’ of the data from a naïve audience.  If 
the error process displays any irregularities, we could go to ARMA, ARCH, GARCH, or 
other types of complex error structures. If pessimistic forecasts is called for, restricting 
the data to start from 1991 will generate them. We can always find some event, such as 
change of monetary regimes, to justify introduction of a structural change, and hence 
discarding of previous data. This does not begin to exhaust the bag of tricks at our 
disposal. For example, we can take logs, differences, or make other suitable transforms of 
any or all variables before or during the modeling process. Faustman and White (1997) 
 10
statement about the LSE approach that  “one brings to the project a set of tools that 
virtually guarantees that one can find a model satisfying the test criteria on any dataset,” 
is a valid critique of all econometric approaches to modeling. While we can make some 
intuitive judegment about the relative validity of the different approaches to forecasting 
described above, it is disturbing that we have no formal or theoretical criteria to guide us 
regarding this matter. 
 
Consumption in Argentina 
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To put the problem in sharper focus, consider the issue of how we could prove correlation  
between two series which are known a priori to be independent. Since (Granger) causality 
is just correlation with lags, these techniques can also be applied to prove causality 
between independent series. Here is a list of ways, all of which are used routinely by 
econometricians: 
 
1. Select the series from among a large set. We found the strong correlation 
between Chinese and Australian consumption by looking at all the 
correlations in the data set. 
2. Adjust the time period to suit. As in the data set above, by discarding different 
segments of the time series, we can change results to suit our tastes. Asghar 
(2007) gives several examples of cases where Granger causality shifts 
depending on the time period chosen. Since outliers have strong effects on 
Least Squares estimates, omitting or including a few observations can have a 
dramtic effect on standard estimates and results. 
3. Use data transformations, nonlinear models, complex error processes, and 
“designer” variables . 
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Many instances of the third method (which is actually a collection of methods) can be 
found in the literature. For example, Baba et. al. (1992) succeed in finding a stable 
money demand equation for M1 in USA upto 1980’s. This time period contains several 
structural changes labeled “missing money” of the 70’s and the “great velocity decline” 
of the 80’s which had frustrated previous attempts. Faust and Whiteman (1997) write 
that:  
 
Finding such a  stable  equation and  a  corresponding economic rationalization  
is  a  heroic  achievement.  The  question  is whether  the  achievement  is  testa-  
ment to the ability of  the method to uncover important economic regularities.  
The  alternative,  of  course,  is  that  the  equation  is  testament  to  the  ability  
of talented  and  imaginative  practitioners  to  generate  a  relation  that  passes  
stability  tests,  regardless of the data. 
 
They go on to discuss how subsequent failures of the model suggest that the second 
alternative holds and cast suspicion on the “designer” variables introduced to achieve 
good fit. The best practitioners can and do overfit, and our statistics fail to give us a clue 
on when this happens; this is a problem that needs serious consideration and further 
study.   
 
6. Lessons from Hendry’s Methodology. 
 
 Leamer (1983) remarked on the fact that the High Priests of econometrics who 
preach that models must be specified a priori undergo a remarkable transformation when 
they enter the computer lab in the basement. In less colorful language, it is virtually 
impossible to adhere to the maxim that regression models cannot be changed in response 
to the data. In economics, models are a dime a dozen while data is precious, so even if the 
first model fits well, exploration of fit of other models is carried out (and should be 
carried out) on the same data set. However, none of our statistics for validating and 
assessing regression models can cope with the issue of data-based model selection and 
change; see Jensen (2000) for a discussion and further references. Even if the selection is 
based on a glance at the data (as in the regression fits to Argentinian consumption data 
above), this disturbs the validity of the regression statistics which are based on the 
assumption that the model is “true” independent of the data, and before any observations 
are made. Leamer (1983) called this assumption the “Axiom of Correct Specification.” 
He discussed how this is obviously false, since  many econometeric models 
simultaneously claim to be the unique true model for the data. At the same time, it is 
fundamental to econometric inference, since all conventional statistics are based directly 
on this assumption and invalid when it fails. 
 
 Hendry’s (2000) methodology is the only one which explicitly takes the 
econometricians search for models into account. It has led to a number of deep insights 
into the process of systematic model search and its consequences, which have yet to be 
fully assimilated by the profession. The fact is the actual methodology utilized by 
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econometricans (including Hendry and his followers; see Darnell and Evans (1990)) is 
much wilder and less subject to rules and regulation than the picture presented by 
Hendry. Even this tame picture overturns numerous suppositions built into the language 
used by econometricians to describe our work. We describe a few issues which arise as 
an almost immediate consequence of viewing models as suitable reductions of the data 
generating process (DGP).  For our present purposes, it suffices to consider the DGP as 
the unique true underlying stochastic process which generates the observed data. 
 
 Suppose that the variables (Xt,Yt,Zt) have a trivariate normal distribution and are 
i.i.d. across time for t=1,2,…,T.  Then the conditional distribution of X given (Y,Z) will 
be stable across time, and an econometrician who posits that X is determined by Y and Z 
will receive a perfect confirmation for his theory.  However, the conditional distribution 
of Y given (X,Z) is also perfectly stable and the theory that X determines Y will also be 
confirmed by the data. In this situation, there is a large number of a priori theories, all of 
which will be correct, true, and perfectly compatible with the data. Any two of the 
variables may be taken as a cause for the third. Also, any variable can be taken as a cause 
for any other, with the third variable being a concomitant variable. The third variable Z 
can also be taken out of the picture by considering the marginal distribution of the first 
two (X,Y). This is also a perfectly valid reduction of the DGP, and yields a true bivariate 
model.   
  
 This existence of several true models is an embarrassment and does not 
correspond to the picture that econometricians have of the modeling process. In the above 
framework, (1) Y = a X + r, and (2) Y = b X + c Z + s are both valid reductions of the 
DGP. It does not make sense to think of the first model as misspecified (as per standard 
econometric terminology), and to think that estimates of “a”  are biased because of the 
missing variable Z. This shows how difficult it would be to arrive at causal relations 
simply on the basis that the data conform to an a priori specification. Hendry proposes to 
solve the problem of multiple true models by using the concept of “variance 
encompassing”  -- the second  model is to be preferred because its residual will have 
smaller variance. In practical situations, the choice between (1) and (2) cannot be made 
on theoretical grounds. Missing observations, or noisy data for Z would lead to (1) being 
a preferred model. In forecasting situations, if Z cannot be accurately forecast, while X 
can be, (1) could be the preferred forecasting model.  
 
 Calculating the effects of interventions requires knowledge of causal mechanisms. 
In a smoothly functioning world with (X,Y,Z) as described above, causal mechanisms 
could not be discovered by observations. All possible causal relationships would 
consistent with the observations. Much as in the concept of natural experiments, Hendry 
proposes to use structural changes to find out about causal relations in this setup. If X is 
determined by Y, without reference to Z, then Y can be taken as the cause of X. If the 
marginal distribution of Z remains stable, the regression of Y and X and X on Y will both 
be stable relationships. If there is structural change and the distribution of Z shifts, then 
the distribution of X given Y will remains stable, while that of Y given X will shift and 
display instability. From this, we should be able to see that Y causes X and not the other 
way around. The fundamental idea appears sound – among a set of correlations, artificial 
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ones will break down, and structural ones will persist through shakeups. Can the idea be 
implemented, and lead to revelations of structural relationships? Only a few researchers 
have used this approach, and we do not have enough evidence or experience to judge this 
as yet. For example, Hendry and Ericsson (1991) used this approach to argue that 
causation runs from prices to money, reversing the standard analysis. Subsequent failure 
of predictive validity of their 1991 model casts some doubt on their results, however. 
 
 Another major insight that results from taking model choice explicitly into 
account, and doing it in the systematic manner suggested by Hendry, is the realization 
that both models and residuals are simultaneously constructed by the econometrician. If 
valid models are required to have i.i.d. residuals, for example, then the modeling process 
will continue until residuals possessing such properties are obtained. The realization has 
led Hendry to change terminology for tests of residuals to “indices of conformity.” 
Furthermore,  the large collection of tools at our disposal virtually guarantees that we can 
find a model with satisfactory indices of conformity for any dataset, regardless of 
whether the  underlying process satisfies the criteria (as noted by Hendry (1993, p. 24)). 
This problem of overfitting plagues all areas of econometrics, and prevents the realization 
of the potential of a number of promising approaches, some of which have been 
mentioned earlier. 
 
6. Strategies for Success. 
 
 In the process of translating a theory into implications about data, so many 
auxiliary assumptions are made that all contact with reality is lost. Any conflict can be 
resolved by adjusting the auxiliary assumptions. For example, suppose we want to learn 
if production process satisfy diminishing, constant, or increasing returns to scale. The 
issue is of substantial significance from the point of view of theory. In carrying out the 
test, we assume a particular form of a production function, a particular way in which 
stochastic errors enter, and particular ways to aggregate and measure factors of 
production. The result of the test has no credibility, because we do not know what we are 
rejecting or accepting: the theory, or the auxiliary assumptions, or the ingenuity of the 
econometrician. This is why Keuzenkamps (2000) quotes Spanos’ that ‘no economic 
theory was ever abandoned because it was rejected by some empirical econometric test.’  
 
 Leamer (1978) has described the practice of econometricians as being a 
“specification search”  -- we look for a regression model which conforms to the theory 
and also to the data. He thinks that this may be a fruitful task as an exploratory device, 
but taking this explicitly into account would substantially improve methodology. He has 
described the different types of devices which could be used to produce models which 
validate and confirm one’s favorite econometric theory. First, one has to choose a set of 
observations which measures a theoretical concept or category. For example, Rodriguez 
and Rodrik (2001) discuss how there is substantial flexibility in the choice of an index to 
measure the loose concept of “openness to trade.” The choice of authors they cite appears 
to be guided by the need to produce a significant variable, which supports the theory that 
free trade promotes growth. Very often the chosen measure can be given several different 
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interpretations, many of which would be contradict the theory under study. In addition, 
one can choose the data set, by specifying the time period, the countries to be studied, etc. 
These choices may be justified by asserting that the theory is more likely to hold over this 
period and those countries, but is more often done in an opportunistic manner. Examples 
where slight changes in time period, choice of data set, functional forms, choices of lag 
length, modified measures for key variables, etc. significantly affect the final result of the 
analysis abound in the literature – indeed, nearly every analysis is of this type. 
Exploratory analysis of this analysis may have merit in producing interesting hypotheses, 
as Leamer argues, but cannot be used to provide evidence for causality.   
 
As discussed earlier, I am not aware of a single instance where a causal mechanism was 
discovered by regression. In contrast, there are several stories of successful discovery of 
causal mechanisms in other areas; see Freedman (2008). Based on these success stories, I 
would like to offer some suggestions which may help improve the situation in the future. 
 
6.1 Seek Confrontations with the Data. 
 
Current methodology seeks accommodation of the data, with calibration being an 
extreme example. Instead, we should follow positivist prescriptions: the power of a 
theory should be judged in terms of what observable phenomena it rules out. Theories 
should be valued for sharp predictions about observations which can be refuted. Good 
theories will be those which survive confrontations with data. Economics is capable of 
generating powerful theories with strong predictions about what may or may not be 
observed in the real world. Consider for example, the “efficient markets” hypothesis, 
which says that all profit opportunities are exploited. This means that studying past data 
on Yen-Dollar exchange rates cannot lead one to find a pattern useful for future 
predictions of this rate. In particular, the correlations between the percentage changes 
should be zero. The graph of daily percentage change shows the (lack) of pattern 
predicted by economic theory. Regressions of the percentage change on lagged values 
confirm that there is no information in the past values on current exchange rate. The 
relation between theory and data is not mediated by a model of uncertain pedigree.  
 
Monthly Percent Change in Yen-Dollar Exhange Rates 
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The idea that stock prices reflect the present discounted values of future returns can 
similarly be directly tested – and rejected. The stock prices are too volatile relative to the 
present discounted values of returns. This anomaly has led to deep examination of other 
possible explanations for determination of stock prices, and many advances in theories.  
 
A clear rejection of static Keynesian consumption functions has led to substantial 
improvements in our understanding of the macro consumption function. Similarly, if 
consumers make consumption plans on the basis of their projections of lifetime income, 
then consumption paths should smooth out income fluctuations. Examination of relative 
volatility of consumption and income streams has led to greater understanding of the 
nature of the consumption function. In general, conflicts between theory and data have 
led to more sophisticated theory and data analysis in econometrics. 
 
Anomalies which could not be explained by dominant theories have often played a key 
role in successful discoveries of causal structure, as documented in Freedman (2008). 
Instead of looking for auxiliary assumptions, functional forms, etc. to fit theories to data, 
we should actively seek ways of formulating theories so that they can directly confront 
data, and be capable of refutation by suitable observations. Such an empiricist 
methodology has a much better chance of discovering real causal chains. 
 
6.2 Look for Alternative Explanations  
 
A satisfactory fit between the data and any given theory is often the goal of econometric 
analysis. Examination of success stories for discovery of causal relations shows how 
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important it is to go beyond this step. Having found a good fit, it is necessary to look for 
alternative explanations for the same data. If satisfactory alternative explanations cannot 
be found, this strengthens the case for our current theory which does fit well. When there 
are other alternative explanations which fit equally well, then we must do “differential 
diagnosis”: look for ways to differentiate between competing explanations. There are 
numerous cases of how this was done cited in the literature. For example, the idea that 
there is a genetic predisposition to cancer which also induces smoking was disproven by 
the study of identical twins with different smoking habits. Active search for competing 
explanations and ways to differentiate between them has been an important element of 
successful discovery of causal mechanisms. The idea of “encompassing” which is one of 
the cornerstones of the Hendry methodology does capture an aspect of this, but this needs 
to be done more regularly and more widely than is current econometric practice. 
 
6.3 Qualitative and Informal Supporting Evidence 
 
This is one of the areas of greatest weakness, where more out of the box thinking is 
requires. The role of hunches, informal reasoning, anomalies, and qualitative evidence in 
discovery of causal mechanisms is well documented – see Freedman (2008). More effort 
to find qualitative implications of hypotheses under consideration, and informal 
evaluations of these implications should prove rewarding. An interesting illustration of 
this is provided in Andrabi et. a. (2007), who study education in Pakistan. Initial findings 
that parents send fewer girls to schools suggest discriminatory behavior. However, closer 
investigation shows that the “distance to school” is a key factor for the schooling decision 
for girls (and not so much for boys). Other data shows that parents invest heavily in 
schooling for children whom they consider bright, without discriminating between girls 
and boys. These hypotheses emerge only after expending “shoe leather,” – the authors 
went to the villages, and walked with the children to their schools. On the ground 
investigations often reveal a reality at variance with general purpose a priori theories. 
Another important instance of this is furnished by Banerjee and Duflo (2004) who 
discuss how to reconcile empirical evidence with the an aggregate production function 
and find it cannot be done. 
 
In addition to using more shoe leather, investigating implications of hypotheses in 
different domains both qualitatively and quantitatively, econometricians need to do more 
informal and exploratory data analysis. History and inertia plays a large role in 
determining the shape of current practice. Econometric and statistical methods were 
developed in a pre-computer era, where many types of analyses were not possible. In 
particular graphical and exploratory data analysis of the type currently routine is not part 
of the standard training of econometricians. Making boxplots, graphs of different sorts, 
and in general doing informal data analyses would add a lot of value, and provide more 
convincing demonstrations than sophisticated econometric analyses in many situtions.  
 
6.4 Randomized and Behavioral Experiments 
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In general, randomization has been a powerful tool in disentangling causal chains. For 
obvious reasons, it has not been used much in economics. Nonetheless, it has been used 
successfully on a number of occasions in the past, and is becoming increasingly 
important. Burtless (1995), Greenberg and Shroder (2004), and many others provide 
strong evidence on the value of randomized experiments in providing evidence on 
genuine causal mechanisms. The Abdul Latif Jameel Poverty Action Lab, started in 2003 
by Professors Banerjee,  Duflo, and  Mullainathan of MIT uses randomized experiments 
as basis for evaluating the effectiveness of poverty programs. Heckman, Lalonde and 
Smith (1999) discuss econometric evaluations of experiments in labor markets which 
provide important evidence regarding the effects of policies.  
 
Direct experimentation and data gathering unconstrained by theory and complex models 
has often led to substantial gains in understanding. Experiments by behavioral economists 
have led to many new insights and theoretical developments; see for example, 
Kahnemann (2003), and Barberis and Thaler (2003). Experimental evidence suggests that 
people increase efforts in response to wage increases, in conflict with neoclassical 
economic theory; see Falk and Fehr (2003). Andrabi et. al. (2007) provide observational 
evidence which shows that fourfold increase in teachers wages does not lead to improved 
educational outcomes in rural schools in Pakistan. The point I am trying to make here is 
that because causality is not directly observable, establishing causality requires piecing 
together evidence from different sources, and out of the box reasoning. Experimental and 
qualitative evidence provides strong supporting evidence, but no single piece of evidence 
may be conclusive. 
 
 
7. Conclusions 
 
 Contrary to our preconceptions, there seems to be no mechanism in place which 
guides research in econometrics towards the truth. Despite over a hundred years of 
experience, there seems no perceptible progress in validity of regression models being 
published, nor is there any gain in insights into the mechanisms of the real world which is 
based on regression models. This corresponds to the Kuhnian insight that progress in 
physical sciences proceeds via revolutions. Transitions between incommensurable 
paradigms makes it difficult to formulate and evaluate the concept of gradual progress 
towards truth. This is equally valid for social sciences, though I believe the underlying 
mechanisms are substantially different.  
 My view is that the incentive structures for research, publications and career 
advancement in academics are largely responsible for this unsatisfactory state of affairs. I 
chose a theoretical econometrics topic for my Ph.D. because it was made clear to me that 
elegant mathematics was preferable to getting your hands dirty with real data. It was 
many years after graduate school that I ran my first real regression with real data, as 
opposed to toy regressions with fake data. Even with real data, my concern was 
establishing the value of certain statistical techniques rather than solving real problems. 
The fragmentation of knowledge is so strong that I was not aware of how important 
development of new estimators and tests is within econometrics, nor of how valuable 
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econometric theory is (or is not) to practitioners. Nor did I have any sense of how 
economic theory and practice influences real world policy decisions, and how these 
influence the lives of human beings living on the planet. Very few have a holistic view of 
the scholastic endeavor in which we are all engaged. As a result, a massive amount of 
brainpower is brought to bear on problems which are completely trivial when viewed in 
the perspective of problems which currently threaten the future of mankind. At the same 
time, very little thought and effort goes into solving complex multidisciplinary problems 
of genuine importance. More efforts towards a holistic approach will prove rewarding. 
Encouraging authors to assess the relevance of their research towards solving genuine 
problems, and engaging more with the real world would go a long way towards discovery 
of genuine causal mechanisms. 
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